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Volume : II, Issue : VII, August - 2012 The Present Scenario of Fiscal Imbalances in Federal India - An Overview K. VETRIVEL , S. BALANARAYANAN and G. RAGUNATH Published By : Laxmi Book Publication Abstract : India is the largest democracy with federal form of government. The fiscal arrangements
in India have evolved in a quasi-federal system to meet the requirements of centralized
planning in a mixed economy structure and their sources of revenue for both Centre and
State were clearly demarcated with regard to the financial relationship and the
responsibilities between them. Our constitution provides residual powers to the Centre
and makes clear division of fiscal powers between the Centre and the State Governments.
Through various source of revenue to government, the Constitution of India provides for
the establishment of a Finance Commission for the purpose of allocation of certain
resources of revenue between the Union and the State Governments. Keywords : Article : Cite This Article : K. VETRIVEL , S. BALANARAYANAN and G. RAGUNATH, (2012). The Present Scenario of Fiscal Imbalances in Federal India - An Overview. Indian Streams Research Journal, Vol. II, Issue. VII, http://oldisrj.lbp.world/UploadedData/1200.pdf References : - Broadway, Robin W., and Paul A.R. Hobson, 1993, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Canada, Canadian tax Foundation, Canadian Tax Paper No. 96.
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