

Vol 3 Issue 5 June 2013

Impact Factor : 0.2105

ISSN No : 2230-7850

---

Monthly Multidisciplinary  
Research Journal

*Indian Streams  
Research Journal*

Executive Editor

Ashok Yakkaldevi

Editor-in-chief

H.N.Jagtap

---

**IMPACT FACTOR : 0.2105**

**Welcome to ISRJ**

**RNI MAHMUL/2011/38595**

**ISSN No.2230-7850**

Indian Streams Research Journal is a multidisciplinary research journal, published monthly in English, Hindi & Marathi Language. All research papers submitted to the journal will be double - blind peer reviewed referred by members of the editorial Board readers will include investigator in universities, research institutes government and industry with research interest in the general subjects.

### ***International Advisory Board***

Flávio de São Pedro Filho Federal University of Rondonia, Brazil	Mohammad Hailat Dept. of Mathematical Sciences, University of South Carolina Aiken, Aiken SC 29801	Hasan Baktir English Language and Literature Department, Kayseri
Kamani Perera Regional Centre For Strategic Studies, Sri Lanka	Abdullah Sabbagh Engineering Studies, Sydney	Ghayoor Abbas Chotana Department of Chemistry, Lahore University of Management Sciences [ PK ]
Janaki Sinnasamy Librarian, University of Malaya [ Malaysia ]	Catalina Neculai University of Coventry, UK	Anna Maria Constantinovici AL. I. Cuza University, Romania
Romona Mihaila Spiru Haret University, Romania	Ecaterina Patrascu Spiru Haret University, Bucharest	Horia Patrascu Spiru Haret University, Bucharest, Romania
Delia Serbescu Spiru Haret University, Bucharest, Romania	Loredana Bosca Spiru Haret University, Romania	Ilie Pinteau, Spiru Haret University, Romania
Anurag Misra DBS College, Kanpur	Fabricio Moraes de Almeida Federal University of Rondonia, Brazil	Xiaohua Yang PhD, USA
Titus Pop	George - Calin SERITAN Postdoctoral Researcher	Nawab Ali Khan College of Business Administration

### ***Editorial Board***

Pratap Vyamktrao Naikwade ASP College Devrukh,Ratnagiri,MS India	Iresh Swami Ex - VC. Solapur University, Solapur	Rajendra Shendge Director, B.C.U.D. Solapur University, Solapur
R. R. Patil Head Geology Department Solapur University, Solapur	N.S. Dhaygude Ex. Prin. Dayanand College, Solapur	R. R. Yaliker Director Managment Institute, Solapur
Rama Bhosale Prin. and Jt. Director Higher Education, Panvel	Narendra Kadu Jt. Director Higher Education, Pune	Umesh Rajderkar Head Humanities & Social Science YCMOU, Nashik
Salve R. N. Department of Sociology, Shivaji University, Kolhapur	K. M. Bhandarkar Praful Patel College of Education, Gondia	S. R. Pandya Head Education Dept. Mumbai University, Mumbai
Govind P. Shinde Bharati Vidyapeeth School of Distance Education Center, Navi Mumbai	Sonal Singh Vikram University, Ujjain	Alka Darshan Shrivastava Shaskiya Snatkottar Mahavidyalaya, Dhar
Chakane Sanjay Dnyaneshwar Arts, Science & Commerce College, Indapur, Pune	G. P. Patankar S. D. M. Degree College, Honavar, Karnataka	Rahul Shriram Sudke Devi Ahilya Vishwavidyalaya, Indore
Awadhesh Kumar Shirotriya Secretary, Play India Play (Trust),Meerut	Maj. S. Bakhtiar Choudhary Director,Hyderabad AP India.	S.KANNAN Ph.D , Annamalai University,TN
	S.Parvathi Devi Ph.D.-University of Allahabad	Satish Kumar Kalhotra
	Sonal Singh	

**Address:-Ashok Yakkaldevi 258/34, Raviwar Peth, Solapur - 413 005 Maharashtra, India  
Cell : 9595 359 435, Ph No: 02172372010 Email: ayisrj@yahoo.in Website: www.isrj.net**



## KARGIL WAR- A REAL POLITIK AND LEARNING IN THE INDIA-PAKISTAN RIVALRY

VINOD KUMAR

Asstt. Prof. Dept. in Political Science  
Aggarwal College Ballabgarh.

### Abstract:

*The India–Pakistan rivalry has been punctuated by recurring militarized crises, four of which have resulted in wars. The enormous costs of this dysfunctional relationship have been obvious since the blood-letting that accompanied partition; today there is the added risk of a nuclear catastrophe.*

### KEYWORDS:

Learning, Rivalry, Militarized, Diagnostic, Environmental.

### INTRODUCTION:

Why cannot the two sides learn to manage their disputes without the risk of war? Will they ever be able to transform their relationship from a competition to achieve relative gains to obtain the absolute gains of peace? Learning, whether functional or dysfunctional, lies at the heart of the answers to these questions. This chapter examines what the parties have learned and have failed to learn over the course of the rivalry. Then it concludes with some thoughts on the requirements for building a more peaceful relationship.

### LEARNING IN THE INDIA–PAKISTAN RIVALRY:

The following discussion of learning in the India–Pakistan rivalry begins with an overview of types and levels of learning by each of the rival states over the course of the rivalry. Then it turns to a consideration of how lessons drawn from the past combined with recent environmental changes affected the behavior of the two parties in the 1999 Kargil crisis.

### INDIA:

Diagnostic learning: The recurring crises, wars, and continuing Pakistani efforts to destabilize the situation in Indian-controlled Kashmir have reinforced Indian distrust of Pakistani intentions. The distrust has led India, on occasion, to overestimate the hostile intentions of Pakistan. The Pakistani incursion across the Line of Control (LoC) between the Indian and Pakistani sectors of Kashmir in 1965, for example, was designed to add to unrest in Kashmir in an attempt to "defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve and bring her to the conference table," but it was interpreted by Indian leaders as the beginning of an attempt to seize the Indian-controlled sector of Kashmir by force. Over the past decade and a half, the participation of Pakistani mujahidin "volunteers" in the Kashmiri insurgency, plus the Kargil incursion, and terrorist attacks in India, have only reinforced India's distrust of Pakistan.

With regard to the capabilities of the two sides, the outcome of the 1971 Bangladesh War unequivocally demonstrated India's military superiority. Pakistan's inferior bargaining power was further underscored by the unwillingness of the United States or China to intervene militarily or diplomatically on

Pakistan's behalf in 1971 or in 1999. In sum, the evolution of the rivalry has reinforced the Indian leadership's aversion to the risks attendant on seeking a peaceful settlement and reinforced its confidence in being able to attain its goals in Kashmir through unilateral means.

Levels of learning: India's goals have not changed over the course of the rivalry. Its behavior has been consistent with the REL hypothesis: states that find themselves in recurring crises with the same adversary are likely to continue strategies that have been successful in previous crises, and to turn to more coercive strategies when they have been unsuccessful. India's cautious, and relatively unsuccessful, response to Pakistani incursions in the Rann of Kutch conflict was followed by an aggressive military response to the Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir a few months later. After being criticized at home for its slow and uncertain response to the Kargil incursion in 1999, India swiftly moved troops to the Indo-Pakistani border in December of 2001 following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. In the latter instance, the Indian leadership was influenced also by lessons that it drew from the American response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.

The lessons that Indian leaders have drawn from the rivalry have reinforced their belief that India's interests are best served by responding in a resolute and uncompromising manner to what they view as an implacably hostile rival. India's decisive conventional military superiority, the co-opting of the insurgency movement in Kashmir by Islamic militants from Pakistan, and an international environment conducive to proactive responses to terrorists and the states that provide them with safe havens, add to the rationale for India's realpolitik approach.

#### PAKISTAN:

Diagnostic learning: The rivalry has reinforced Pakistani perceptions that not only is India intent on attaining permanent accession to the two-thirds of Kashmir that India controls, but that India remains a threat to seize the Pakistani-occupied third of Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) as well.

A number of Pakistani leaders, especially within the military, believe also that India's leaders harbor a long-term goal of reuniting the subcontinent under Hindu control. To them, there has been nothing in India's behavior since 1949 to cast doubt on the first assumption. India has refused adamantly to negotiate any reduction in its control over Indian-occupied Kashmir, while it has continued political and military efforts to solidify its control. Pakistani fears of more expansionist Indian goals were reinforced by India's intervention in the Bangladesh civil war in 1971, and, more recently, by bellicose rhetoric from the BJP party. As for its relative capabilities vis-a`-vis India, attribution distortion has contributed to a Pakistani belief in its inherent military superiority. For example, Pakistani President Ayub Khan attributed Indian caution in the Rann of Kutch conflict to Hindu passivity, rather than the logistical and operational advantages afforded to Pakistan in the Sind-Kutch theatre. Pakistani leaders have attributed India's measured responses in more recent crises to a combination of Indian cautiousness and Pakistan's nuclear deterrent capability.

#### LEVELS OF LEARNING:

Even from a realpolitik perspective, the growing gap in military superiority and in bargaining power more generally, should cause the Pakistani leadership to reassess its goals. But as the rivalry has evolved and intensified, the reputational importance of the Kashmir issue has grown. Therefore, learning by Pakistan's leaders has been at the level of means. Moreover, that learning has been distorted by the psychological effects of the enduring rivalry, domestic pressures, and the few options available to a revisionist state facing a stronger status quo power. Over the course of the rivalry, India's unwillingness to negotiate or to accept mediation of the Kashmir issue has left Pakistan with four options: (1) reduce its aspirations by accepting the status quo in Kashmir; (2) force a change in the situation through unilateral military action; (3) alter the situation sufficiently to persuade India to view the status quo as unsatisfactory; or (4) create a regional crisis that will lead to the diplomatic intervention of concerned major powers. Pakistani leaders have ruled out simply accepting the status quo, and, since the Second Kashmir War, they have recognized that the second option is not feasible. Instead they have followed a two-pronged strategy that combines the third and fourth options. Since the start of the rivalry Pakistan has encouraged and supported opposition movements in Kashmir and, on occasion, in India. The objective has been to promote sufficient instability, either to cause India to reconsider its unyielding stand on Kashmir, or to induce powerful third parties, who would otherwise remain aloof, to intervene diplomatically.

**KARGIL CRISIS AND WAR, 1998–1999:**

The Kargil crisis had its antecedents in an ongoing dispute over the location of the LoC as it passes through the Siachen glacier, one of the highest and most inhospitable heights in the Himalayas. Kargil is situated on Highway 1-A from Srinagar to Leh, which is the only land route to supply Indian troops on the glacier. Controlling the high ground over Kargil would allow Pakistan to cut off the Indian supply route. Sporadic low-level hostilities began in 1984 and continued into the late 1990s. Beginning in the fall of 1998, Pakistani light infantry troops, accompanied by mujahidin volunteers, infiltrated undetected across the LoC to establish positions on the Himalayan peaks, which Indian troops regularly abandoned during the harsh winter months. When returning Indian troops discovered the Pakistani emplacements the following May, the ensuing fighting led to "a short, sharp, war." India's attempts to dislodge the Pakistani troops led to high casualties and little success until Indian air strikes, coupled with strong American diplomatic pressure, led to a Pakistani withdrawal.

The Kargil crisis surprised Indian leaders because it occurred just a few months after a summit meeting between Sharif and Vajpayee at Lahore had led to a relaxation in tension. Why the Pakistani government undertook such a provocative action during a period of relative *de tence* has been the subject of much speculation. The most likely explanation is a combination of domestic pressures, fragmented decision-making, recent changes in the military leadership, strategic opportunity, and, not least, the prospect of loss on the central issue of Kashmir. During the late 1990s Islamic militants were becoming an increasingly potent force in Pakistani domestic politics at the same time that India was gaining the upper hand in quelling the Kashmiri independence movement. As Tremblay and Schofield note in Chapter 10, Sharif's decision was influenced both by pressures from fundamentalist parties demanding action, and from military leaders who were determined to reverse Indian gains in Siachen. But two other factors also influenced Pakistan's Kargil challenge, as well as the Indian response: the addition of a nuclear component to the rivalry, and the "spirit of Lahore" itself.

The nuclear factor The immediate reaction to the 1998 nuclear tests by military officers on both sides was that full-scale conventional war had become unthinkable. But, from the Pakistani perspective, the nuclear tests had led to a significant shift in the military equation, a shift that, in their view, reduced the risk that limited military hostilities would escalate to a general war. The paradox of nuclear crises is that mutual recognition that all-out war could be catastrophic for both sides can encourage greater risk-taking because each side assumes that the other's fear of escalation to nuclear war will raise its tolerance of coercive behavior. In fact, there is empirical evidence that nuclear crises do escalate to higher levels without war than conventional crises. This "stability-instability paradox" can be extended to limited conventional war. The shared fear that a general war could lead to a nuclear war reduces the risk that the other party will escalate a limited engagement to a general war; therefore the shared risk encourages nuclear states to undertake limited wars. Based on this line of reasoning, the new environment created by the nuclear tests in 1998 encouraged Pakistan to launch the Kargil operation on the assumption that India would not respond by attacking across the LoC at a strategically more favorable location. India, they assumed, would be restrained by fear of triggering a full-scale conventional war, which, in turn, could escalate to nuclear war. The Indian government's Kargil Review Committee described the Pakistani operation as "a typical case of salami slicing," a Cold War phrase referring to attempts to achieve small territorial gains that would not be sufficient to prompt the other side to risk a military escalation that could lead to a general war that could become nuclear.

Some leading figures in Pakistan have asserted that Pakistan's nuclear capacity played a role in deterring India from using its advantage in conventional forces on three earlier occasions: a preventive attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities in 1984; a planned Indian cross-border attack

in conjunction with the Brasstacks exercise in 1986–87; and in 1990, when India was purported to be considering air attacks on mujahidin camps in Azad Kashmir.<sup>32</sup> There is no solid evidence that any of the three assumptions regarding the military plans of the Indian government are accurate. But such arguments gain currency because of a predisposition on the part of Pakistani leaders to assume the worst in Indian intentions. That predisposition has been reinforced by over five decades of recurring crises and wars. Thus, in a classic example of attributional distortion, it is presumed that the fact that India did not launch an attack on any of those occasions can be explained only by a situational constraint, namely Pakistan's nuclear deterrent capability. More important, this reasoning encourages the belief that Pakistan's nuclear capabilities have redressed the military imbalance sufficiently to allow it to pursue low-intensity conflict, such as its support of insurgency movements in Kashmir, and even limited conventional hostilities, such as in Kargil, without running the risk of triggering a general war.

On the other hand, the apparent risk of escalation to nuclear war reopens the possibility that a demonstration crisis will lead to forceful diplomatic intervention by the international community, most

notably the United States. There is no direct evidence that Sharif or his advisors planned the Kargil operation for the express purpose of obtaining American diplomatic intervention. But Pakistani leaders learned early in the rivalry that only outside pressure could move India to discuss any alteration of the status quo in Kashmir, and that outside pressure could be obtained only through creating sufficient instability on the subcontinent to threaten international security. The Pakistani leadership had observed how in the 1987 and 1990 crises, the United States, mindful of the risk of nuclear war, played a proactive role in defusing tensions and preventing the outbreak of war. The Kargil crisis did lead to diplomatic intervention by the United States, but the US did not use its diplomatic leverage to reopen the Kashmir issue. Instead, US President Clinton devoted his efforts to pressuring Pakistan to withdraw its troops, while refusing Sharif's plea to mediate between India and Pakistan.

India did respond cautiously to the Kargil incursions. Its leaders were willing to accept heavy casualties by attempting to scale the Himalayan peaks under heavy fire, rather than extending the war horizontally by attacking at a more favorable point along the LoC. Whether India would have continued to demonstrate restraint had its air force, coupled with American diplomatic pressure, not forced the intruders to retreat is an open question. But following the nuclear tests of 1998, Indian Home Secretary Advani had offered the view that India's second-strike capabilities would allow it to respond to Pakistani incursions, or support of terrorism, with "hot pursuit" across the LoC without fearing a Pakistani nuclear response.

The "Spirit of Lahore" and Kargil One of the more intriguing questions about Pakistan's Kargil incursion is why it was undertaken when the rivalry appeared to be in remission. The Lahore Agreement, with Vajpayee's dramatic "bus diplomacy" and the agreement on confidence-building measures, occurred as violence was waning in Kashmir. But peace and stability favor the continuance of the status quo. With India solidifying its hold on most of Kashmir, and the international community turning its attention elsewhere, Pakistan needed to find a means of reigniting the flames of the rivalry. In fact, a period of relative peace is not an unusual precursor to a challenge from the revisionist party in a continuing rivalry. The Argentine attempt to seize and hold the Falkland Islands in 1982, for example, came just a month after cordial negotiations with Great Britain. As in the Kargil War, there were a number of factors precipitating the Argentine action, including domestic pressures and strategic opportunity – Britain had ended its naval patrols off the islands – but a contributing factor was the realization that the status quo was becoming more comfortable for their adversary.

Egypt's Sadat faced an analogous situation when he launched his limited war against Israel in October of 1973 to regain Sinai territory occupied by Israel. Sadat held out no hope of regaining all of the Sinai. The 1973 war, like Kargil, was undertaken partly to achieve a limited success that would strengthen morale. But also it was a demonstration crisis designed to create the risk of escalation to general war that would engage the superpowers.<sup>36</sup> More specifically, Sadat wanted to persuade the United States to bring pressure to bear on Israel to reconsider its unyielding position vis-à-vis the status quo.

In all three instances, albeit for different reasons, the only member of the global community with the capability to shift the balance in bargaining power was the United States. In 1973, Sadat was able to convince US Secretary of State Kissinger to restrain Israel and to obtain an outcome that ultimately led to a negotiated return of the Sinai to Egypt. In 1982, US Secretary of State Haig attempted to mediate the Falklands crisis, but he was unable to restrain Britain from going to war. In 1999, Pakistan's Sharif tried to persuade President Clinton to mediate the Kargil War and the Kashmir issue; instead Sharif was pressured by Clinton to withdraw Pakistani troops and mujahidin irregulars from their positions across the LoC. Sharif and his advisors failed to remember the diplomatic lessons of the Bangladesh War when the United States' half-hearted efforts to restrain India failed. Even in 1971, the United States was beginning to have doubts about its Cold War support of Pakistan, particularly in light of Pakistan's friendly relationship with China, and the global support for the Bengali independence movement that followed the Pakistani army's brutal actions in East Pakistan. By 1999 the Cold War was a distant memory; India's economic importance to the United States had grown substantially; Pakistan was impoverished and facing US economic sanctions. Pakistani leaders underestimated the United States' desire to maintain good relations with India, and they overestimated American bargaining power vis-à-vis India, particularly with regard to Kashmir.

#### **KARGIL AND REAL POLITIK LEARNING:**

It is not hard to imagine a different scenario having resulted from the Kargil crisis and war. Frustrated by its inability to dislodge the Pakistani troops from their positions on the peaks in the Kargil area, India could have launched an attack across the LoC into Azad Kashmir at a more favorable location. Ensuing combat with Pakistan's regular army could have escalated to general war. Then, if India's superior forces crossed into Pakistan and threatened a major city, say Lahore, Pakistan's leadership might have concluded that it was faced with an immediate threat to survival that required launching a preemptive

nuclear strike.

The Kargil War was the first Indo-Pakistani war since the Indian victory in the Bangladesh War of 1971, and the first war over Kashmir since 1965. Unlike the two previous wars, Kargil was short, and limited in scope and intensity. Had the two sides learned something about crisis management in the ensuing decades? A comparison of the behavior of the two sides in 1999 and 1965 Kashmir crises is instructive. Both crises began with the infiltration of mujahidin irregulars across the LoC into Indian-controlled Kashmir. In both instances, the Pakistani challenge came during a period when India was strengthening its control over Kashmir – presidential rule in 1965, a series of elections and the waning of the resistance movement in the mid to late 1990s – and the Pakistani leadership was feeling increasing pressure from hardline factions to take action. In both instances Pakistani military leaders were convinced that they could create a *fait accompli* – a shift of the LoC in their favor – and defend it in a short, limited war. In each instance the success of the strategy was dependent on a cautious Indian response, and, ultimately, diplomatic intervention by the UN or major powers that would lead to reopening negotiations over Kashmir's future. In 1965, India responded to Pakistan's incursion by sending regular troops into Azad Kashmir, and Pakistan responded with "Operation Grand Slam," a full-scale armored attack that led to a general war. The stalemated war was costly for both sides and it settled nothing. In 1999, India reacted in a more measured manner, and the hostilities remained limited to the Kargil area.

Pakistan's failure in 1965 and its decisive defeat in 1971 should have warned it against attempting a military *fait accompli* in 1999. Conversely, India's previous military successes would seem to have prescribed a more forceful response in 1999. One explanation for the Pakistani action, aside from domestic factors, is that it was prompted by the shift in the strategic environment created by the shared risk of nuclear war. Pakistan's Musharraf claimed that India's cautious response confirmed the validity of that perception. But another explanation is the poverty of imagination that has been endemic in the Pakistani leadership's narrow *realpolitik* approach to the rivalry, particularly within the highly influential military establishment. The goodwill nurtured by Lahore was quickly discarded when it appeared to Pakistani military leaders that there was a window of opportunity to achieve a strategic gain along the LoC. The success of the highly risky operation depended on assumptions regarding likely Indian and American responses, which were based on faulty diagnostic learning regarding Indian resolve and American interests. India did not respond to the Pakistani incursion by geographically expanding the war. But that may be only because it was unnecessary to do so. Indian air power and American diplomatic pressure were sufficient to force a Pakistani retreat. Kargil intensified the deep Indian distrust of Pakistan, which Indian leaders now characterized, in the jargon of the day, as a "rogue state." India's Prime Minister Vajpayee, who expended a good deal of political capital on the Lahore summit, complained that he had been "stabbed in the back." The Kargil experience could not help but reinforce the Indian view that the only way to deal with Pakistan was through the application of force, a perspective reflected in the Kargil Review Committee Report.<sup>42</sup> Applying a different twist to the stability–instability paradox, Indian strategists had their own low-intensity warfare strategy, which included covert operations by special forces in Pakistan, "hot pursuit" of Pakistani militants across the LoC, and degrading Pakistan's military capabilities through a war of attrition. If hostilities escalated to general war, Pakistan, they argued, would be restrained from a nuclear response by India's second-strike capabilities. Thus neither the Kargil experience, nor the nuclear cloud that hung over the crisis, produced changes in goals for either side. Like the seven militarized crises before it, Kargil deepened mutual hostility and reinforced each side's determination to demonstrate its resolve in any future crisis. Whatever learning occurred remained within the bounds of *realpolitik* assumptions about inter-rivalry relations.

#### CONCLUSION:

Despite their rhetoric, the governments of India and Pakistan are aware of the costs and risks associated with nuclear war on the subcontinent. In all three of their post-nuclear crises – 1990, 1999, and 2001–02 – India and Pakistan have restrained their military behavior. In fact, even in those crises that ended in war, the forces of the two sides have shown remarkable restraint on the battlefield, as they have avoided attacking cities and other civilian targets. What the two sides have been either unable or unwilling to do, is to draw useful diplomatic lessons from their own behavior. The termination of the rivalry itself would require learning at a higher level, that is, a shift in goals as well as means. A significant reduction in the mutual distrust that infects Indo-Pakistani relations requires that both sides publicly disavow hostile goals. Pakistan would have to give up the goal of attempting to achieve control over all of Kashmir. India would have to renounce any intention of seizing Azad Kashmir, or of harboring any long-term goal of reuniting the subcontinent under Indian control. It is not enough to change goals; the changes must be communicated to the other side in a manner that leads to trust in the other's intentions. Ultimately, diagnostic learning would

have to extend to empathy, that is, an understanding of the interests of the other party, and the constraints under which it operates. Without mutual trust and empathy, there is little likelihood of reaching a lasting settlement of the Kashmir issue and terminating the rivalry. Witness the fate of the many peace plans designed to bring an end to Israeli–Palestinian rivalry. Only when the parties develop some trust in each other's intentions will it be possible to move away from contentious bargaining to a problem-solving approach to the issue of Kashmir's future.

What I have suggested is a tall order given the bitter residue of over half a century of recurring crises and wars. Recently, however, there have been some hopeful signs. The 2001–02 border crisis between India and Pakistan led to renewed efforts at confidence-building measures, and to an agreement to conduct bilateral talks that would include Kashmir on the agenda. Two years later, Pakistani President Musharraf promised to put an end to the use of Pakistani territory by guerrilla or terrorist groups crossing into Kashmir or India proper.<sup>55</sup> As this is being written, an unprecedented number of bilateral talks are under way on issues ranging from trade, cross-border travel, and narcotics control, to nuclear and conventional ballistic missile confidence-building measures, the Siachen border, and Kashmir. There is no doubt that these moves, not unlike the Soviet–American de'tente that began in the 1960s and 1970s, have been influenced by the addition of a nuclear dimension to the relationship between the two rivals.. It is not inconceivable that we are witnessing the beginning of a comparable process in the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, with Pakistan finding itself in the position of the former Soviet Union.

To choose to accept the risks of peace in a rivalry saturated with distrust and hostility requires extraordinary leadership skills and great personal courage. The requisite leadership skills include not only the vision to see beyond the realpolitik boundaries of the rivalry, but also the ability to impart that vision to the rest of the nation. If the Indo-Pakistani rivalry now resembles the Soviet–American rivalry in its nuclear dimension, it also shares the seemingly intractable territorial dimension that lies at the heart of the Middle East rivalry.

#### REFERENCES

- I.Hussain Ijaz ( 1998) .Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective, National Institute of Pakistan Studies
- II.Singh Jaspreet (2004). NCES: Seventeen Tomatoes– an unprecedented look inside the world of an army camp in Kashmir,Vehicle Press; Montreal, Canada.
- III.Behera,Navnita(2000). State, identity and violence : Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, New Delhi: Manohar.
- IV.Ganguly Sumit (1997),. The Crisis in Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge : Cambridge U.P
- V.Sumantra Bose (1997). The challenge in Kashmir: democracy, self-determination and a just peace, Sage, New Delhi.
- VI.Jha, Prem Shankar (1996). Kashmir, 1947: rival versions of history, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- VII.Joshi Manoj (1999). The Lost Rebellion (New Delhi: Penguin India, New Delhi
- VIII.Evans Alexander (2001) Why Peace Won't Come to Kashmir", Current History. Vol 100, No.645.April 2001.pp170-175.



# Publish Research Article International Level Multidisciplinary Research Journal For All Subjects

Dear Sir/Mam,

We invite unpublished research paper.Summary of Research Project,Theses,Books and Books Review of publication,you will be pleased to know that our journals are

## Associated and Indexed,India

- \* International Scientific Journal Consortium Scientific
- \* OPEN J-GATE

## Associated and Indexed,USA

- Google Scholar
- EBSCO
- DOAJ
- Index Copernicus
- Publication Index
- Academic Journal Database
- Contemporary Research Index
- Academic Paper Databse
- Digital Journals Database
- Current Index to Scholarly Journals
- Elite Scientific Journal Archive
- Directory Of Academic Resources
- Scholar Journal Index
- Recent Science Index
- Scientific Resources Database

Indian Streams Research Journal  
258/34 Raviwar Peth Solapur-413005,Maharashtra  
Contact-9595359435  
E-Mail-ayisrj@yahoo.in/ayisrj2011@gmail.com  
Website : www.isrj.net